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Case No. 20050296-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Vincent Lawrence Phipps, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for criminal mischief, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (Supp. 2002). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES1 
1. Did the trial court correctly instruct the jury on the State's burden to prove the 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt? 
In his issues statement, defendant identifies five issues. See Aplt. Brf. at 2-4. 
Defendant's issue #2—whether trial counsel was "ineffective for failing to invoke the 
exclusionary rule during the trial"—was subsequently withdrawn by order of the Court 
on defendant's motion. Order dated February 2,2006. Defendant's issue #5—whether 
trial counsel was "ineffective for failing to argue for admission of Exhibit No. 17 for 
impeachment purposes"—was not addressed in the argument of defendant's brief. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 22-44. Accordingly, the State addresses issues #1, #4, and #5 only 
(renumbered herein as issues 1,2, and 3). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Standard of Review. "[W]hether a jury instruction properly states the law is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness/' State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ^ 17,40 P.3d 611. 
However, where an instruction challenged on appeal was requested at trial by the 
appellant, the invited error doctrine forecloses appellate review. State v. Perdue,, 813 
P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Did the trial court err in entering a conviction and sentence for a second 
degree felony rather than a third degree felony? 
Standard of Review. This Court "afford[s] the trial court wide latitude in 
sentencing and, generally, 'will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it is an 
abuse of the judge's discretion/" State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 66,52 P.3d 1210 (quoting 
State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 8,40 P.3d 626). An abuse of discretion will be found if the 
trial court "fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed 
exceeds the limits prescribed by law." Id. Where a sentence was not challenged below, 
defendant may show plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Hansen, 
2002 UT 114, H 21 n.2, 61 P.3d 1062. 
3. Did the trial court err in admitting the police transcript of defendant's 
telephone message? 
Standard of Review. Trial courts have broad discretion in determining 
admissibility of evidence and will only be overturned for abuse of discretion. In re L.N., 
2004 UT App 120, % 10,91 P.3d 836. A trial court abuses its discretion in this area only 
if the ruling was "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 
1271 (Utah App. 1996) (citation and quotation omitted). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (West 2004) is relevant to a determination of this case. 
The relevant portions of that statute are reproduced in the Argument of the brief. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with criminal mischief, a second degree felony. R. 1-2. 
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial. R. 21. Defendant 
timely filed a Notice of Alibi Defense. R. 30-31. Following a two-day trial, a jury found 
defendant guilty as charged. R. 71-77,95,121-22. The trial court sentenced defendant 
to an indeterminate prison term of one-to-fifteen years and ordered him to pay 
$4,658.09 in restitution to Allstate Insurance Company. R. 98-100. Defendant timely 
appealed. R. 101-02. 
Summary of Facts 
On a Sunday morning, December 28,2003, the Lawson family awoke to find that 
someone had smashed out the windows to their three vehicles: Mrs. Lawson's 
Suburban, Mr. Lawson's Ford truck, and their son Chris's Jeep Cherokee. R. 121:69-73. 
The Jeep Cherokee was also scratched and dented. R. 121:71,102. Repairs would total 
$6,347.632: $2,164.22 to replace the windows to the Suburban, $508.16 to replace the 
windows to the Ford truck, $1,985.71 to replace the windows to the Jeep Cherokee, and 
Not all of the repair work was done, however. One of the windows in the Jeep 
Cherokee was scratched rather than broken and Chris Larson chose not to have it 
repaired as a " trade-off' with the glass company which did not require him to pay his 
$500 insurance deductible. R. 121:117-18. 
3 
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1 
another $1,689.54 to repair the body damage to the Jeep Cherokee. R. 121: 77-79, 91, 
116. This destruction was so unexpected and senseless that it "shocked7' and 
"dumbfounded" the Lawsons, particularly because no one else in the neighborhood 
had been affected. R. 121:73. The Lawsons called the police. R. 121. 73. Mrs. Lawson 
i 
felt so "devastated and violated" that she also called a friend for emotional support. R. 
121:74,94. 
Officer Eddie Guerrero came to the house to investigate. Id. Officer Guerrero 
photographed the damaged vehicles and interviewed the Lawsons. R. 121: 73-74. 
While he was taking their statements, Chris's friend Terrill Johnson—who, together 
with Chris's girlfriend Becky Bird, had first noticed the broken windows and notified 
the Lawsons, R. 121:101 — arrived at the house and played a message he had received 
on his cell phone from defendant: 
Hey, bitch! Hey, bitch! This is f ing Vinnie, bitch! Hey, all you 
motherf ers get f ed up. You tell Chris to come find me. You tell that 
f ing Josh to come find me, bitch. You whore bitch, motherf er piece of 
shit, whore burn motherf r. Come find me. I'll kill all you . . . . I'm not 
gonna kill anybody. I'm not gonna hurt anybody. I just want you guys to 
come talk to me, okay? Okay? Hi, Scott. I just want you guys to come to 
talk to me okay, cause I'm kind of offended. I thought this was dead and 
gone, then you get some (inaudible) it's over. You better come find me, 
whore. 
State Exh. 14; R. 125 (State Exh. 15); see also R. 121: 73-75. After taking the Lawsons' 
statements and listening to the message on Terrill's cell phone, Officer Guerrero asked 
Terrill to bring the phone to the police station so he could record the message. R. 121: 
74. Mr. Lawson, after hearing this message, called defendant's mother and accused her 
sons and their friends of causing the damage. R. 121:80-81. 
4 
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Defendant harbored a great deal of animosity towards Chris Larson. The 
preceding Friday night, December 26, defendant was working at Zach's, a Moab bar 
and pizza parlor, when he witnessed a brief altercation (Chris would describe it as a 
"push and shove" encounter that "didn't even last but a minute or two," R. 121:105) 
between Chris and Nick Phipps, defendant's brother. When defendant tried to break it 
up, he fell and hit his head on a table or post. R. 121:105-106,122:42. There were no 
additional problems that night, however, and Chris "figured everything was done and 
over." R. 121:106. 
It turned out everything was just beginning. The following night, Saturday, 
December 27, Nick was assaulted by Tracken Johnson (Terriirs older brother) and Josh 
Alario. R. 122:45.3 Believing the attack was instigated by Chris, defendant became 
"really upset" and wanted to "[b]eat them up." R. 122:49,64,68-70. After he found out 
that Nick had been beaten up, defendant said, "[Tjhat's [f][ ]ed up. Let's go whoop 
somebody's ass." R. 122:127. Defendant had been drinking "quite a bit" that night. R. 
122:49,131. 
After speaking with his mother and brother, defendant left the house to "go 
settle it up with Chris." R. 122:52,132. He did not get very far before his mother and 
brother picked him up and drove him to the apartment of his brother-in-law and sister, 
Bill and Rebecca Stock. R. 122:54. Defendant made a number of phone calls after 
arriving there, including a call to Terrill Johnson, with whom he left the threatening 
Josh Alario was convicted of assault in another proceeding. R. 122:64. 
5 
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message. Id. After some time there, defendant claimed to have gone to his girlfriend's 
house to spend the remainder of the night. R. 121:140. 
It was now early Sunday morning. Liz Northrop was arriving at a neighbor's 
house and saw a tannish-brown, four-door Taurus or Tempo slow down near the 
Larson's home. R. 121:90. A picture of Mrs. Phipp's car matched this description and 
was identified by Liz as the car she saw. R. 121:174. At around the same time, another 
neighbor, Aaron Rodman, was watching a movie in his home and testified to hearing 
"loud bangs, windows break/' and a couple of people running up the street. R. 121:179. 
Later that Sunday morning, after Officer Guerrero left for the first time, the 
Lawsons again surveyed the damage to their vehicles, at which time Chris noticed 
some blood on his car. R. 121: 75. Terrill then left for the police station to apprize 
police of the blood and allow them to record the message. R. 121:76. Mrs. Lawson also 
called police and told them about the blood and that she believed defendant's brother 
Nick was coming to the house "because he said so" and because he wanted "to solve a 
problem in a manner and [she] didn't want him around." R. 121:76-77. Officers Eddie 
Guerrero and Mike Wyler returned to the home and took samples of the blood, which 
was later tested and found to be defendant's. R. 121: 77,122:33. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Reasonable Doubt Instruction. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in 
giving the reasonable doubt instruction because it included language rejected by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305. Defendant, however, 
urged the trial court to adopt the instruction and thus waived any challenge to the 
instruction under the invited error doctrine. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. Conviction for Second Degree Felony. Defendant claims that the trial court erred 
in sentencing defendant for a second degree felony rather than a third degree felony 
where the restitution order was less than $5,000. This claim fails because the degree of 
an offense and its corresponding sentence is not dependent on the amount of court-
ordered restitution, but on the pecuniary loss caused by defendant as established at 
trial. In this case, the evidence established pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not plainly err in sentencing defendant for a second 
degree felony and counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to that sentence. 
III. Admission of Unofficial Transcript. Defendant claims that the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting a police transcript of a recording admitted at trial. 
This claim likewise fails. In the first instance, any alleged error was harmless. The 
transcript accurately reflected the recorded message and thus did not unfairly prejudice 
the jury. And given defendant's history with the victims, the blood evidence, and the 
recording itself, there is no reasonable likelihood that admission of the police transcript 
affected the outcome of the trial. In any event, admission of the transcript was not 
error. The court instructed the jury to use the transcript only as an aid in listening to 
the tape, allowed the jury to compare the transcript with the tape, and allowed counsel 
to offer any alternative interpretations of the tape. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT CANNOT CHALLENGE THE REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION BECAUSE HE INVITED ANY ERROR. 
In its third instruction to the jury, the trial court explained that "the State must 
prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt" and that "[i]f the State 
has failed to prove any one of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, [the jury] 
should find the defendant not guilty." R. 122:147-48; accord R. 122: 83. In its sixth 
instruction, the court further explained the State's burden to prove defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
Number six, a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then the defendant should be acquitted. The State must 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is 
reasonable given all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based 
on fancy, imagination or wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind or convince the 
understanding of those bound to act conscientiously and enough to 
eliminate reasonable doubt. 
Just parenthetically, I will note that eliminate means obviate. 
Reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain 
based upon the evidence in the case. 
R. 122:148-49; accord R. 86. 
On appeal, defendant complains that the trial court erred in instructing the jury 
that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is . . . enough [proof] to eliminate reasonable 
doubt." Aplt. Brf. at 25. Defendant contends that this "eliminate reasonable doubt" 
8 
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instruction is the functional equivalent of the "obviate all reasonable doubt" instruction 
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305 (Reyes II). 
Aplt. Brf. at 22-26. He acknowledges that this challenge to the jury instruction was not 
preserved at trial. Aplt. Brf. at 26. He contends, however, that he is entitled to review 
under the "exceptional circumstances" exception to the preservation rule because the 
"obviate all reasonable doubt instruction" was under review by the Utah Supreme 
Court at the time of trial and was ultimately abandoned. Aplt. Brf. at 26-27. Defendant, 
however, waived any challenge to the instruction because he invited any error. 
After the evidence was presented and the jury excused, counsel for defendant 
requested that the court "include language that says that the State must obviate or 
eliminate all reasonable [doubt]," rather than merely "eliminate reasonable doubt." R. 
122:142. The court observed that its "instruction says [']enough to eliminate reasonable 
doubt.[']" R. 122: 142. This did not satisfy counsel. He acknowledged the court's 
reluctance to use "obviate" and confirmed that his own informal polling of a jury 
revealed that most jurors did not know the meaning of obviate. R. 122:142. However, 
he argued "obviate" should be used because it was the word used by this Court in State 
v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841 (since reversed in Reyes II). R. 122: 142. The 
following exchange then took place: 
Court: If I read the Reyes case unequivocally as requiring district 
judges to use that word, I would use it despite my conviction 
that it is pointless to use it. But I think Reyes can be read as 
based on something else. And so I'm going to use the word 
"eliminate" until the Court of Appeals states unequivocally 
that we must not use the word "eliminate," we must use the 
word "obviate." 
Counsel: I understand that, Your Honor. Please note my objection. 
9 
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Court: You insist on the use of the word "obviate" as opposed to 
"eliminate"? 
Counsel: Yes, I do. It is up on appeal right now, Your Honor. It should 
be coming down pretty soon, but it hasn't. 
Court: [Certiorari] was granted in that case. 
Counsel: I believe. I think they joined three or four cases together. 
Court: Your problem is not with anything else except that I should 
delete the word "eliminate" and use instead the word 
"obviate"? 
Counsel: Yes. Or for that matter, you could use them both if you want. 
R. 122:142-43. The court ruled that counsel was "free . . . to point out to the jury that 
the word "eliminate" really can be understood as meaning "obviate" and said that it 
was willing, if asked, to "jump in right on [his] side to help them understand better." R. 
122: 143-44. The court then asked whether that covered counsel's objections and 
counsel replied, "That's it." R. 122:144. 
Defendant did not simply fail to preserve a challenge to the "obviate all 
reasonable doubt instruction," but urged the court to adopt it, insisting that "obviate" 
be substituted for, or used in addition to, "eliminate." The trial court acquiesced and 
instructed the jury that "eliminate means obviate." R. 122:149. The law has long been 
settled that "a party cannot appeal a jury instruction that the same party requested." 
State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah App. 1991). Inasmuch as defense counsel 
himself chose to argue for the instruction, defendant is "deemed to have invited the 
error (if there was any) and waived any objection." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,561 
(Utah 1987). 
10 
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Defendant nevertheless contends that because the "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
instruction was later rejected in Reyes II, he is entitled to appellate review under the 
"exceptional circumstances" exception to the preservation rule. Aplt. Brf. at 26-27. But 
for the same reasons that invited error defeats a claim of plain error, it also defeats a 
claim of exceptional circumstances. 
The "invited error doctrine arises from the principle that 'a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing error.'" State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,115, 543 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (quoting 
State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 9, 86 P.3d 742). As explained in Winfield, "the 
doctrine furthers this principle by 'discourag[ing] parties from intentionally misleading 
the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal/" Winfield, 2006 
UT 4, f 15 (quoting Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 12) (brackets supplied in Winfield). In 
sum, this Court will not permit a party to "set[] up an error at trial and then 
complain[ ] of it on appeal." Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205 (citations omitted). 
"With the possible exception of an aberration or two, 'exceptional circumstances' 
is a concept that is used sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional situations, 
for cases . . . involving 'rare procedural anomalies/" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5,11 (Utah 
App. 1996), (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209 n.3 (Utah 1993)), cert denied, 931 
P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). It has never been applied where the appellant challenges on 
11 
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appeal a position he actively endorsed at trial. This Court should not, therefore, 
address defendant's claim.4 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ENTERING A CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY RATHER THAN A THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 
The trial court entered a judgment of conviction against defendant for criminal 
mischief, a second degree felony, sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 
one-to-fifteen years, and ordered him to pay $4,658.09 in restitution. R. 98-99. 
Defendant contends that his sentencing for a second degree felony exceeded the limits 
prescribed by law. He reasons that because criminal mischief is a second degree felony 
only if it causes or is intended to cause a pecuniary loss of $5,000 or more, his second 
degree felony sentencing was excessive because the restitution order was less than 
$5,000. Aplt. Brf. at 35-40. This claim is frivolous. 
Criminal mischief is a second degree felony under the statute if the evidence 
establishes that "the actor's conduct cause[d] or [was] intended to cause pecuniary loss 
equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(3)(b)(i) (West 2004). 
The evidence introduced at trial established that the pecuniary loss exceeded $5,000 in 
value. Marcie Lawson testified, and Rick Thompson of Rick's Glass confirmed, that the 
replacement cost for the windows was $2,164.22 for the Suburban, $508.16 for the Ford 
4
 Even had defendant not waived a challenge to the reasonable doubt instruction, 
his claim would lack merit. In Reyes II, the Supreme Court concluded that the "obviate" 
test "works to improperly diminish the State's burden" of proof "[t]o the extent that [it] 
would permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently 
defined." 2005 UT 33, |^ 28. The prosecutor did not make such an argument here. See 
R. 122:155-56. Accordingly, there is no risk that the jury found defendant guilty under 
a standard less than reasonable doubt. 
12 
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truck, and $1,985.71 for the Jeep Cherokee. R. 121: 77-79,116.5 The testimony also 
established that the repair cost for the body damage to the Jeep Cherokee was $1,689.54. 
R. 121: 79, 91-92. The evidence thus established a total pecuniary loss of $6,347.63. 
Given this evidence, it cannot be said that the trial court exceeded the limits prescribed 
by law or otherwise abused its discretion in sentencing defendant for a second degree 
felony. 
Defendant contends that he should have been sentenced for a third degree felony 
because the amount of restitution requested and ordered by the court was less than 
$5,000. Aplt. Brf. at 36-37. Court-ordered restitution, however, has nothing to do with 
the degree of offense for which a defendant may be sentenced. 
Restitution is defined as "full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a vict im.. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(d) (West 2004). The restitution 
ordered by the court was equivalent to the replacement cost of all the damaged 
windows to the vehicles. See R. 121: 77-79, 116 ($2,164.22 + $508.16 + $1,985.71 = 
$4,658.09). For reasons unknown, the victim did not request restitution for the cost of 
repairing the body damage to the Jeep Cherokee. See PSI at 6 (R. 123). The testimony at 
trial was nevertheless unequivocal. Mrs. Lawson testified, and Alan Moore of the auto 
5
 One of the windows in the Jeep Cherokee was scratched, not broken out. R. 
121: 117. Rick Thompson testified that the scratched window nevertheless required 
replacement because it could not be repaired. R. 121: 117. Although the $324.43 
replacement cost was included in the invoice, Thompson testified that he did not 
replace the window. R. 121:117-18. He explained that because Chris Lawson did not 
have the money to pay his $500 deductible, they arranged a "trade-off" where the 
scratched window was not replaced and Lawson was not required to pay his 
deductible. R. 121:118-19. As confirmed by Thompson, the invoice thus "reflected] 
the damage that was done" to the vehicle. R. 121:119. 
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body shop confirmed, that the cost of repairing the body damage to the Jeep Cherokee 
was $1,689.54. R. 121: 79, 90-93. The restitution order thus represents "partial" 
payment for the pecuniary damages caused by defendant's conduct. 
Because the pecuniary damages caused by defendant's conduct exceeded $5,000 
in value, his claims of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel fail. Where there 
is no error, there can be no plain error. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, % 34,48 P.3d 953. 
And there can be no ineffective assistance of counsel where an objection would have 
been futile. State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^26, lP.3d 546. 
III. THE POLICE TRANSCRIPT OF DEFENDANTS TELEPHONE 
MESSAGE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
Finally, defendant argues that "the trial court erred in allowing an uncertified 
copy of the telephone transcript to be submitted to the jury." Aplt. Br. at 40 
(capitalization and bolding omitted). This argument has no merit. 
The tape recording of the phone message was received into evidence without 
objection and played for the jury during the testimony of Officer Guerrero. R. 121:136-
37. Thereafter, Officer Guerrero testified that a transcript of the tape was made, that he 
had compared it to the tape, and that it was accurate. R. 121:138. When the State 
moved to admit the transcript into evidence, defendant objected, arguing that "[t]he 
tape speaks for itself" and represents "the best evidence." R. 121:138. Counsel argued 
that admission of the tape would "substitute] the transcriber's ears for the jury's ears." 
R. 121:138. The court later admitted the tape, but explained that it did so only as an aid 
to the jury in determining what was actually said: 
I'm going to receive [the transcript], but I want to make sure the jury 
understands. The primary evidence is the tape itself. I'm going to admit 
14 
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[it] just as a possible aid to you in understanding what's on the tape. But 
ultimately it's what you hear on the tape that matters, not [the transcript]. 
. . . I'm just going to admit for the purpose of suggesting a possibility 
about what it is you're hearing there. And you can listen and see if you 
actually agree that's what you're hearing. If someone else has a suggestion 
as to what those things mean—or what you're hearing—what the words 
actually are, I would be happy to receive that as well. 
R. 121:144. The state later brought in the transcriptionist, who authenticated the 
transcript and testified to its accuracy. R. 121:184-87. 
Defendant complains that several discrepancies exist between the police 
transcript and the trial transcript. Aplt. Brf. at 42-43. But significantly, he does not 
challenge the accuracy of the police transcript when compared to the tape recording 
itself. Indeed, a review of the tape recording and the police transcript reveals that the 
police transcript accurately reflects the recorded message. Compare R. 125 (State's Exh. 
15) with State's Exh. 14 (in large manila envelope). The inaudibles in the trial transcript 
merely reflect the reality that a full and accurate transcript cannot reasonably be made 
upon hearing the recording once, without an opportunity for review. 
Where the police transcript accurately reflects the recorded message, any alleged 
error is harmless and the Court need not consider the merits of defendant's claim. The 
jury's consideration of the accurate transcript cannot be said to provide the State with, 
in the words of defendant, Aplt. Brf. at 44, an "unfair advantage" in presenting its 
version of what was said in the tape. See People v. Brown, 275 Cal.Rptr. 268, 276 
(Cal.App. 1990) (holding that "[tjranscripts of admissible tape recordings are only 
prejudicial if it is shown they are so inaccurate that the jury might be misled into 
convicting an innocent man"). While a reading of the transcript might have been 
offensive to many jurors, it could be no more offensive than the recording itself. 
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Moreover, absent the transcript, the jury still had before it the recording itself, 
revealing all the anger, sarcasm, and varied tones that the transcript could never 
expose. See R. 125. In addition to the recording, the State introduced evidence 
demonstrating that the spattered blood found on the windows of one of the vandalized 
cars matched that of defendant. R. 121:11; R. 122: 33-34. Given defendant's history 
with the Lawsons, the blood evidence, and the recording itself,"there is no reasonable 
likelihood that [admission of the police transcript] affected the outcome of the 
proceedings/' State v. Evans, 2001UT 22, ^ 20,20 P.3d 888. Defendant's claim thus fails 
under the harmless error doctrine. 
Defendant's claim also fails on the merits. Defendant cites three cases in support 
of his claim that the admission of the transcript was improper: People v. Baylor, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 864 (Cal.App.2d 2005);6 State v. Sykes, 857 So.2d 638 (La.App.3d 2003); and 
United States v. Delgado, 357 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). Aplt. Brf. at 40-42. None support 
his claim. To the contrary, they support the trial court's admission of the transcript. 
In People v. Baylor, the California court of appeals concluded that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting a transcript of an audiotape where "the 
transcript fairly reflected the conversation." Baylor, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 879. The 
California court also cited Brown, supra, at 15, for the proposition that admission of a 
transcript would only be prejudicial if it was so inaccurate that it might have misled the 
jury. Id, at 878. 
6
 After the California Supreme Court granted review, further action in this case 
was deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in another case, 
or pending such further order of the court. People v. Baylor, 120 P.3d 689 (Cal. 2005). 
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Quoting Sykes, defendant argues that "'[b]y permitting the jury to see transcripts 
prepared by the State, it gave the Prosecution the added advantage of 'interpreting' 
difficult to understand audiotapes'" and that '"[t]he transcripts gave an unfair 
advantage to the State to present it's [sic] 'version' of what was said when, in fact, better 
evidence was available.'" Aplt. Br. at 41 (quoting Sykes, 857 So.2d at 657). The quoted 
language from Sykes, however, does not represent the holding of the court, but a 
summation of the defendant's argument. See Sykes, 857 So.2d at 657. And contrary to 
defendant's claim, Sykes did not conclude that admission of the transcripts had denied 
Sykes her right to a fair trial. Aplt. Brf. at 41. The Louisiana court in fact rejected the 
very arguments made by Sykes and repeated by defendant here. The court held that "a 
'transcript of a tape [is] admissible over a best evidence objection, since the transcript 
provide[s] the jury with a convenience in following the playback of the tape.'" Sykes, 
857 So.2d at 658 (quoting State v. Burdgess, 434 So.2d 1062,1066 (La. 1983)).7 See also 
State v. Richardson, 821 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Tx. App. 1991) (holding that providing both 
tapes and transcripts satisfied the best evidence rule), vacated on other grounds, 824 
S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 
Defendant's reliance on United States v. Delgado is also misplaced. In reviewing 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in using transcripts as an aid in listening to 
tape recordings, Delgado made four inquiries: "[1] whether the court reviewed the 
n 
Although Sykes noted that "[t]he jury was not able to view the transcripts 
during deliberations," the holding does not necessarily suggest that the jury would 
have been precluded from viewing them as an aid in following the playback of the tape, 
as was done in this case. 
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transcript for accuracy; [2] whether defense counsel was allowed to highlight alleged 
inaccuracies and to introduce alternative versions; [3] whether the jury was instructed 
that the tape, rather than the transcript, was evidence; and [4] whether the jury was 
allowed to compare the transcript to the tape and hear counsel's arguments as to the 
meaning of the conversations/7 Delgado, 357 F.3d at 1070. Contrary to defendant's 
claim, the Ninth Circuit did not consider these as necessary procedural conditions for 
use, but rather factors for consideration. Delgado, 357 F.3d at 1070-71. A consideration 
of these factors here reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
the police transcript. 
As in Delgado, id. at 1071, the trial court did not review the transcript beforehand. 
As in Delgado, id. at 1071, defense counsel was allowed to highlight alleged inaccuracies 
and to introduce alternative versions. The court stated that it would be "happy to 
receive" any alternative interpretations. R. 121:144. And as in Delgado, id. at 1071, the 
jury was instructed to rely on the tape, rather than the transcript, and was permitted to 
compare the transcript to the tape. The court instructed the jury that "the primary 
evidence is the tape itself" and that the transcript was being admitted "as a possible aid 
to [the jury] in understanding what's on the tape." R. 121:144. Defense counsel offered 
no alternative transcript or version of the recording. Thus, as in Delgado, the "court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing the transcripts to be admitted for the limited 
purpose of a listening aid." Delgado, 357 F.3d at 1071. 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of March, 2006. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
frey S. Gray 
"Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on March 6,2006,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellee upon the defendant/ appellant, Vincent Lawrence Phipps, by causing them 
to be delivered by first class mail to his counsel of record as follows: 
Andrew Fitzgerald 
55 East 100 South 
Moab, UT 84532 
S. Gray 
Assistant Attorney General < 
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INSTRUCTION NO. If? 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. 
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in 
view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on 
fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or 
convince the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, 
and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. 
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Transcribed for Moab City Police, Officer Eddie Guerrero 
11/8/04 
Case # 03-4398 





CASE NO ; - m W & 
DATEREC'D J / o*%/o£? 




This is fucking Vinnie, bitch! Hey, all you motherfuckers get fucked up. You tell Chris 
to come find me. You tell that fucking Josh to come find me, bitch. You whore bitch, 
motherfucker piece of shit, whore burn motherfucker. Come find me. I'll kill all 
you.. ..I'm not gonna kill anybody. I'm not gonna hurt anybody. I just wantyou guys to 
come talk to me, okay? Okay? Hi, Scott. I just want you guys to come to talk to me okay, 
cause I'm kind of offended. I thought this was dead and gone, then you get some 
(inaudible) it's over. You better come find me, whore. 
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